CHINA INCIDENT SERIES-No. 3

MATSUOKA'S MESSAGE
On October 9, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, President of the
South Manchuria Railway Company, released a message to the
American public through the Associated Press in which he
outlined in concise and impressing form, Japan's mission in
Asia. In a nutshell, he retraces the lessons taught by history,
the true significance of which China has yet to learn. Until
then, there is little hope for inter-racial harmony and amity,
and consequently, everlasting peace in the Far East.
So impressive and clear cut is the presentation of Japan's
position by Mr. Matsuoka, that its reproduction here as a preface to this pamphlet, entitled "The China Incident and Japan,"
is felt most appropriate and befitting.

SPEAKING FOR NIPPON
At last Nippon is in for the final, for a knock-out decision; a once-for-all house cleaning of all tortuous tangles in
the Sino-Nippon relations which have been plaguing the East
for ages.
In 1904, she staked her national existence in a fight
against Russia. But that was to beat back a nightmare
avalanche from without-an affair around outer fences.
This time, she is dealing with a festering sore deep down
within the bosom of Eastern Asia threatening her very life
as well as those of all Asian races with sure and inescapable
death. It is calling for heroic surgery: She has takeq up
her scalpel. She will permit no foreign interference whatsoever here.
Plainly, therefore, the present crisis is infinitely bigger and
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more significant than the Russian war of thirty-three years
ago.
One thing is clear even to a donkey running along an
Asian highway :-a constant and hearty cooperation between
the peoples of Nippon and of China, that and that alone can
work out the destiny of Asia. Nobody knows this better than
Nippon and she knows also that the two things poisoning the atmosphere between the two peoples are the drunken orgy of
China's own war lords and politicians and the Red CommWlism
eating in!o the heart of China from without. Nippon is out
to-day to put a potter-fiel<;l wooden cross over these common
enemies of the Chinese people and of the lasting peace of
Eastern Asia.
Nippon has no quarrel whatever with the people of China.
Our treatment of the Chinese who are living in Nippon to-day,
is the most convincing comment on this point. In Hokkaido,
in northern Nippon, a Chinese committed suicide rather than be
compelled to return to his own native home, a little over a
month ago. The Chinese in Nippon were happy and well
protected, enjoying all the freedom of a Nippon citizen even
while the infamous Tungchou massacre was all over the front
pages of our newspapers.
A historic fact dominates Asian scenes like a Fuji :
namely : Without Nippon there can be no China.
Suppose Nippon had chosen to play safe and crawled into
her shell on her own tight little island in the fall of 1904 ?
Suppose again that Nippon had gone down before the
tidal-wave sweep of Russian adventure for her own Far Eastern
Empire on the plains of Manchuria in the spring of 1905 ?
There would have been no Manchuria, for which the
Chinese patriots froth at the mouth or the League of Nations
denounce Nippon as an international robber. And in place of
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the proud Republic of China, one would have had seen a crazy
quilt of European colonies after the fond fancies of the author
of the ".Break-Up of China."
No Nippon: No China.
For some mystic reason our Chinese friends in Nanking
find it so convenient to forget this little fact.
We are free to admit that Nippon has been exceedingly
annoying tO her neighbour, China. Nippon is expanding. And
what country in its expansion era has ever failed to be trying
to its neighbours ? Ask the American Indian or the Mexican
how excruciatingly trying the young United States used to be
once upon a time.
But Nippon's expansion, like that of the United States,
is as natural as the growth of a child. Only one thing stops
a child from growing : death.
Geneva has been trying to pass this death sentence on
Nippon since the Manchurian incident, masking it with tinsel
phrases of pious hypocrisy. But Nippon does not seem amiable enough to die even for the sweet sake of Geneva-made
peace.

China and Nippon f,!.re two brothers who have inherited a
great mansion called Eastern Asia. Adversity sent them both
down to the depth of poverty. The ne'er-do-well ·elder brother
turned a dope fiend and a rogue, but the younger, lean, but
rugged and ambitious, ever dreamed of bringing back past
glories to the old House. He sold newspapers at a street
corner and worked hard to support the house. The elder flimflammed the younger out of his meager savings and sold him
out to their common enemy. The younger in a towering rage
beat up the elder-trying to beat into him some sense of shame
and awaken some pride in the noble traditions of the great
house. After many scraps, the younger finally made up his

.
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mind to stage a show-down fight. And that is the fight now
raging along the North China and Shanghai fronts.
" Nippon is fighting for loot and profit ! " That is the
refrain of all anti-Nippon propaganda the world over. It is
an insult to plain arithmetic. Nippon has already spent billions
of yen in the present crisis. The Imperial Diet a couple of
weeks ago voted for more than two billion yen just to tide
over a few months. The final total may reach fifty billions
or more : who knows ? Can a financial optimist anywhere
conceive of Nippon getting back even two, three billion yen a
year from China ? And that amount would be a meager
annual interest charges on the Nippon outlay for this present
crisis. Absurd even to a primary school arithmetic class, all
this fight-for-loot theory.
For what, then, is Nippon fighting ?
She is fighting simply for her conception of her Mission
in Asia. There is the whole answer.
She is fighting to keep Asia from becommg another Africa
and, in particular, at the present moment, to save China from
the death grip of Comintern. Just that.
Billions of yen, thousands of her young men's lives-all are
offerings on the altar of her own conviction and aspirations. She
is simply footihg the bill which the leadership of Asian races
calls for. No treasure trove is in her eyes-only sacrifices
upon sacrifices. No one realizes this more than she does. But
ihe very life of her own depends on it as those of her neighbours as well.
The all-absorbing question before Nippon today, therefore
is : CAN SHE BEAR THE CROSS ?
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THE CHINA INCIDENT AND JAPAN .
I. JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE CONFLICT
1. Japan and Anti-Japanism in China

Of all the questions which are vibrating through the international firmament of discqssion since the outbreak of the
current Sino-Japanese conflict, the most pertinent remaihs to
be that which relates to the driving forces which led Japan
into action.
Stripped of all details the current China Incident can be
said to represent the over-due clash between Japan's inevitable
continental policy and China's national policy of anti-Japanism
as an ill-conceived pretext for national unification. The firm
grasp upon these two driving forces in the two countries concerned is essential for proper understanding of the issues at
stake.
Since the Manchurian Incident, Japan has been directing
her entire effort on the continent jn assisting the growth and
development of Manchoukuo and in re-establishing friendly relations with China. Mea,nwhile, she has been witnessing a
growing rivalry among nations of the world, especially in
Europe, and the consequent reappearance of a heated armament
race. Most noteworthy to Japan has- been an amazing expansion of the Soviet war machine which, on the one hand, forced
Japan to join hands with Germany for mutual defence against
Communism, and, on the other hand, increased Japan's concern
in protecting her rights and interests in the Far East against
Soviet threat. This concern naturally involved, in view of
Japan's vast interests in Manchoukuo, the assurance of peace
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and order in North China as well as the security of Japan's
rights and interests in the whole of China. In the face of
this situation, however, China has deliberately singled out Japan
in pursuing a decidedly hostile policy during recent years and
has been slighting Japan's friendly overtures for peaceful
negotiations with discourtesy and contempt.

It is obvious that Japan is much concerned over North
China. It adjoins Manchoukuo geographically, and the people
of North China and Manchoukuo, as neighbours, are most intimately tied to each other in communication and finance, and
in the constant interchange of goods. Should the movements
directed against Japan and Manchoukuo be tolerated there and
become rampant, it is not necessary to stretch one's imagination very far to viSualize that peace and order in Manchoukuo
would be _gravely menaced. Moreover, Japan's rights and interests in North China are closely related to the development
and utilization of resources such as iron, coal and cotton, but
hostile movements there would jeopardize those rights which
are vital to Japan, especially in view of growing international
unrest. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that
Japan began to look at the affairs in North China with increasing concern. It was in the face of such a situation that the
Nanking Government intensified anti-Jap~nism as a means of
rallying the people in the ii}terest of national unification and
of expanding its oWn power thereby. In line with this policy,
the Nanking Government has even gone so far as to demand
Japan to give up her rights and interests in North China
already described.
In this picture, one must not overlook OOth the peculiar
nature and the true significance of the anti-Japanese movements in China. For, anti-Japanism in China in recent years,
while it .may be said. to reflect in a way the popular national
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consciousness nurtured by the general spirit of patriotism and
anti-foreign_ism, is neither a spontaneous expression of the
people's patriotic spirit nor an insatiable desire of the Chinese
people in general. In other words, it is something which has
been forced upon the people by the Nanking authorities.
The Nanking Government is a peculiar existence. Its
authority is maintained, not through its indisputable strength
and ability to govern the whole of China, but through an ingenious manipulation and combination of one-party bureaucracy,
compradorism, and military dictatorship. Naturally, the only
effective means available in keeping the centralized political
power at Nanking is to camouflage its weakness which has
found a ready slogan in "Kang-jih Chiu-kuo" or "Resist
Japan and Save China," backed by China's age-old policy of
"Yuan-chiao Chin-kung" or "Befriending Distant States and
Antagonizing Neighbours" and the utilization of Western
Powers.
Such being the background of the anti-Japanese movements in China, the Kuomintang leaders were faced with profound dilemma at the time of the outbreak of the current
conflict. Indeed, men like Wang Chao-ming, Ho Ying-chin,
H. H. Kung, T. W. Sung, and above all Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek knew too well the comparative strength of the Japanese and Chinese armies and China's doomed defeat if she
dared oppose Japan with arms. It is for this reason that outwardly they pretended to assume a strong stand but inwardly
were hoping to avoid a general clash with Japan if it could
be avoided at all.
It was at this juncture that a new force had entered the
Nanking circles and began to manipulate public opinion. It
was the pro-Soviet force, represented by such strong leaders
like Feng Yu-hsiang, Sun Fo, and Li Lieh-chun. They were
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quite aware of Chiang's weakness and planned to embarrass
him by insisting upon the adoption of a strong anti-Japanese
policy. Behind them stood, of course, the crafty figure of the
Comintem with its ulterior motive of com~unizing China.
The anti-Japanese movements, launched to strengthen the
Chiang dictatorship at Nanking, however, were already beyond
Chiang's control. Its propaganda contaminated even the innocent school children and bred among young officers of Chiang's
own army a blind confidence to fight Japan. In short, the
Nanking leaders have been playing with Japanese patience a
bit too long and have awakened to discover that it is next to
impossibility to undo a broken egg. And thus the curtain was
raised upon the tragic drama of an armed conflict. It may
be added here with emphasis that the wide-awake Generalissimo
did not forget to strengthen his own political power in planning
the campaign and wisely manoeuvered to annihilate his provincial enemies, especially the armies of Yen Hsi-shan, Han
Fu-chu, Li Sung-jen, and Pai Chung-hsi, by mobilizing and
sending them to the first line of fighting. This was indeed a
" two-birds-with-one-stone " policy but, alas, the foxy local war
lords knew too well Chiang's deceiving manipulations.
Such was the internecine but ingenious hand of the Comintern which successfully forced the Compradore Government at
Nanking to shift from the capitalistic influence of the Powers
to the control of the Red Popular Front. Such also was the
masterly China policy of the Soviet Union. And thus China
and Soviet Russia began to walk hand in hand as far as the
anti-Japanese movements in China were concerned.
The Chinese Communist Party had been tirelessly working
toward this end for some time. By 1935, its machinations
were so successful that it issued on August 1, a memorable
manifesto under the title of " Anti-Imperialism of the Chinese
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Communist Party and Anti-Japanese National Salvation." It
openly advocated in this manifesto a policy of cooperation with
the Nanking Government and of widening the popular front
for immediate anti-Japanese resistance. From that date on, it
intensified its efforts, on the one hand, in trying to nourish
Chiang's anti-Japanese strength ,by arousing racial hatred
among the masses and, on the other hand, in planning for an
inevitable collision between Tokyo and Nanking as it knew
too well that there would be a limit to Japan's patience under
constant provocations. Behind this delicate manoeuver, needless to add, was the Soviet Far Eastern policy of both solidifying the Soviet position in China and attaining realization
of its own military program by bringing about the weakening
of Japan's Soviet policy through a Sino-Japanese clash. The
Sian coup d'etat staged by Cha~g Hsueh-liang was merely an
episode in this masterly Comiritern manoeuver. In the dramatic negotiations which followed to save the Generalissimo, while
the British part was undeniably noticeable, the fact remains
that Chou Ssu-lai, the chief "brain " of the Chinese Communist
Party, was active in bridging the group represented by Chang
Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng and the Nanking Government
represented by T. W. Sung, thus clearly demonstrating the Red
initiative involved in the affair. It was on account of such a
clear-cut background that the Japanese Government, in spite
of its extreme patience and determined desire for peaceful
negotiations, found it impossible to reach a solution, not even
a compromise of any kind.
When the North China Incident finally broke. out, the
Nanking Government unhesitatingly liberated seven imprisoned
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, including Shen Chunju, Wang Tsao-shih, Shih Liang, and Chang Nai-chi, transformed the Communist armies under the command of Chu-Te
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and Mao Tse-tqng into a wing of the anti-Japanese units, and
concluded a non-aggression treaty with Soviet Russia on
August . 21. China was thus placed under the complete dQmination of the Soviet Union. Foreign Commissar Litvinoff
denied the existence of any Sino-Soviet secret agreement but
the Kokutsu (Manchoukuo News Agency) on September 24, reported from Shanghai the seriousness with which the Nanking
Government was studying the draft treaty of Sino-Soviet
mutual assistance. The draft treaty is reported as follows :
1. China and the Soviet Union will establish a joint
defence committee against Japan, with headquarters at Ulanbator, Outer Mongolia.
2. Nanking and Moscow will cooperate in every way
to attain as fully as possible these objectives :
a. International trouble will be created in either
Europe or the Far East in order to render useless the
Japan-Germany Anti-Comintern Agreement.
b. The two countries will strive to scatter as much
as possible the Japanese forces, through action on the
Soviet-Manchoukuo border, ·the Manchoukuo-Outer Mongolian border, and the North, Central and South China
fronts.
c. The Comintern will work to disturb thought in
Japan.
d. Guided by the Comintern, guerilla fighting will
be taken up to undermine the Japanese military operations.
e. To attain these objectives, the Soviets will take
charge of operations in North China and along the Manchoukuo borders. Central and South China, with Shanghai as the center, will be under Chinese control.
3. The Soviet Union will supply China with volunteer
soldiers and technical advisers, as well as arms and ammunition in case of need. This will be done on the following lines.
a. China will deposit half of what it owes the Soviet
Union in the State Bank of the U. S. S. R. to pay for the
arms and ammunition it receives.
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b. China will pay· fixed sums to the soldiers and
technical advisers supplied by the Soviets. The Soviet
Union shall insure theii- lives in the " gosstrah " (Soviet
State Insurance Bureau).
c. The first installment of munitions will be deliverEd
to the Chinese between the end of September and th~
first of December. It will be. transported via Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.
d. The first shipments will consist of 362 airplanes
of various types ; 100 anti-aircraft guns ; 200 pieces of
field artillery ; 120,000 rounds of cannon balls ; 150,000
rifles; 60,000,000 rounds of ammunition; 100 tanks; 1,500
anti-aircraft machine-guns ; 2,500 motor cars and cycles ;
5,000 horses and 2,000 carts.
4. In exchange for Soviet assistance, China will promise
to carry out the following undertakings :
a. The Comintern is to be permitted full freedom
of activity in China.
b. China will grant to Moscow full freedom of political and economic activity in Outer Mongolia and in any
consequences.
c. Nanking gives Moscow the right to build a railway connecting Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and China Proper.
China will later make other concessions in North China.
d. If and when the anti-Japanese move ends in success, China promises to drive out, .with Soviet assistance,
all other foreign political influences now active in China.
It was through such circumstances that the Nanking

policy of opposing and oppressing all Japanese activities in
China underwent a complete change in tactics, from the reliance upon and manipulation of Western Powers to the more
malignant and ferocious anti-Japanism under the Red influence.
The Red influence, in fact, has deliberately sacrificed China
before the mischievous god of anti-Japanism and signs of
transforming her into a second Spain are already in evidence.
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2. Japan's Demands upon China

In facing the current China Incident, Japan's most fundamental demand upon China is a just understanding by the
Chinese people of the inevitability of Japan's continental policy.
It is a well known maxim of physics that a force seeking
expansion, when suppressed all around, will inevitably break
out at the weakest point of resistance. Fundamentally, Japan's
continental policy has been similarly propelled, . not by any
luxurious aspirations for additional territory, but by an inevitable social necessity. It can not, and must not, be compared,
therefore, with the conquest of extensive colonies staged by
the leading Western :Powers in the not distant past. By deliberately ignoring the true significance of the Japanese policy
and branding it simply as militaristic or imperialistiG, China is
merely courting disaster upon herself.
Consider for a moment, then, Japan's inevitable necessity
of expansion. Her population is increasing at the rate of about
one million a year. This expanding power can be mitigated
only by emigration abroad and increase of exports. Unfortunately for Japan, however, both of these roads are closed
against her. And, under the present international setting,
China is the only country toward which Japan's expansion can
be directed naturally. Such being the case, China is Japan's
inevitable life line and any attempt to check Japan therefrom
is a physical impossibility.
Yet, Japan is not asking China to recognize this physical
inevitability unconditionally. Japan has historical basis in asking China for cooperation in facing such a physical inevitability.
It is nQt necessary to recount here what China's international position was at the time of the Sino-Japanese War or
the Russo-Japanese War and through the two decades leading
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to the emergence of Manchoukuo. Any one who is familiar
with the history of the Far East since the closing decade of
t\J.e last centur:y can not overlook the telling fact that, not
only has China been completely impotent in preventing the inroad of Western imperialism, but she h~ shown no capacity
to contribute anything toward the maintenance of peace in the
Far East. Rather, she has been the cause of disturbances, in
one way or another, through the past fifty years. Indeed,
where is the country, if Japan is excepted, which · can wholeheartedly maintain stability in the Orient and which is willing
to pay even the greatest of sacrifices in the name of its
prosperity? Where would China be if it weren't for Japan?
And yet, China proposes to deny all S\lCh historical facts. She
proposes to ignore, in line with the same policy, the very fact
that it is the result of Japan's historical advocacy which has
assumed concrete form in the establishment of Manchoukuo
and the North China agreements in her defence. Thus, the
"Tangku Agreement" of May, 1933, and the "Umezu-Ho
Agreement" of May, 1935, both concluded between Japan and
China as an aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, have been
trampled one after another under China's feet on account of
her erroneous conception of Japan and her self-styled overconfidence. How can Japan, after paying more than her share
of sacrifices in the name of peace in the Far East during the
past fifty years, remain unconcerned with such an attitude of
mind?
In the second place, Japan, for the purpose of promoting
mutual development, advocates the necessity of both attaining
intimate political and cultural relationship and strengthening
the mutual economic tie between the two neighbours. Japan
has been playing an impprtant role in the economic development of China in the past and is destined to do so in the
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future. Take for example Jap~'s contributions in the field of
China's foreign trade. As the following tables* show, Japan
has occupied a leading parition, second only to the United
States, in her trade relationship with China since 1934 :
China's Foreign Trade, 1934-36
1. Imports (Unit : 1,000,000 Chinese dollars)

1936

1935

1934

PerPer·
PerAmount centage Amount centage Amount centage
174.9
185.5
19.6
U. S. A. ............... 'nl.7
26.2
18.9
16.3
12.2
15.1
153.5
Japan .......... ..... ... 126.8
139.6
11.2
150.2
15.9
9.0
103.4
Germany ... ......... 93.4
10.6
11o.5
11.7
England ............ 124.6
12.0
98.2
59.4
516.1
55.8
599.7
63.5
Total .............. . 616.5
Grand total (in924.7
944.5
eluding others) 1,038.9
Countries

2. Exports (Unit: 1,000 000 Chinese dollars)

1935

1934

1936

Countries

PerPerPerAmount centage Amount centage Amount centage
23.7
186.3
26.4
136.4
U.S.A. ............... 94.4
17.6
82.0
14.2
102.3
14.5
Japan ............ ...... 81.2
15.2
28.9
5.0
39.1
5.5
3.6
Germany . .. . ... .. . .. 19.1
49.4
8.6
64.8
9.2
England .. . .. .. .. .. . 49.8
9.3
296.7
51.5
392.5
55.6
Total ............... 244.5
45.7
Grand total (in576.3
706.8
cluding others) 535.7

*

Figures from the Chinese Customs Reports.

In the amount of investment in China, Japan occupies a
similar dominating position, this time second only to that of
England. According to investigations made by Prof. C. F.
Remer, the leading foreign investments in China, including
government loans, at the end of 1931 were distributed as
follows (in 1,000,000 U. S. dollars) :
Countries
Investments
England .. .. .. .. . .. . . ... ... . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. 1,189.2
Japan ..... ................. ............ ..... 1,136.9
U. S. S. R. ... . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. .
'n3.2
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Government
Loans
225.8
224.1

Percentage
36.7
35.1
8.4

Countries
Investments
U.S.A. ...... ............ .. ....... .........
196.8
France........................ ............... 192.4
Germany
87.0
Belgium ........................
89.0
The Netherlands ........................
28.7
Italy ............
46.4
Total (including others)............ 3,242.5
0 . . 00 . . . . . . 00 . . . . 00 . . . . . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . .

00.... .. .. ..

0000

oo· . . . . . . . . . . . .

00 . . . . . . . . .

Government
Loans
Percentage
41.7
6.1
97.4
5.9
12.0
2. 7
48.0
2.7
18.7
0.9
42.0
1.4
710.6
100.00

If we consider the significance of investments in China in
their relations with the investing country, however, the importance of Japanese investments in China is found to be beyond comparison with those of England. Again, according to
Professor Remer, the percentage of investments of various Powers
in China with respect to total investments abroad is as follows :
England, 5.9% ; U. S. A., 1.2%; France, 4.8%; Germany, 4.3%;
and Japan, 81.9%. These figures eloquently show that Japan's
investments abroad are almost entirely concentrated in China,
whereas the major investments of other leading Powers are
allocated elsewhere, other than in China. Herein lies the additional meaning of Japan's claim that China is Japan's life line.
The most intimate character as well as the mutuality of the
economic relations between Japan and China thus shown, in
spite of Nanking sponsored anti-Japan• movements and boycott of Japanese goods, is and should be the most important
factor in deciding the future course of Sino-Japanese relations.
Japan only desires that China clearly understand such intimate relationship between the two countries, strengthen the
concert of action with Japan as the stabilizing force in the
Orient, and cooperate fully for the establishment of permanent
peace in the Far East. For this purpose, the Nanking Government must first of all liquidate its contradictory policy of
using anti-Japanese movements as a means of mitigating the
frictions arising between China and international vested interests. It must also purge China of all intrigues which are
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carried on by the Red Popular Front under .th~ guise of antiJapanese movements.

II. JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRENGTH
Japan's every hope to localize the Lukowkiao incident was
frustrated by the Chinese and the field of Sino-Japanese conflict gradually expanded over a wide area. To meet this
growing need, the Japanese Government obtained the sanction
of the Imperial Diet for a total appropriation to date of
¥ 2,540,000,000, ¥ 520,000,000 by the Special (71st) Session
and ¥ 2,020,000,000 by the Extra (72nd) Session, and announced
its willingness to meet additional expenses in case of prolongation of the conflict. Compared with ¥200,000,000 expended
in the Sino-Japanese War and ¥ 1,450,000,000 in the RussoJapanese War, the total appropriations to date indicate both
the tremendous development of Japan's economic strength since
those two Wars and the degree of her detennination in facing
the current China Incident.
The financial position of the Japanese Government is admittedly none too bright. The public debt already exceeds
¥ 10,000,000,000 and now an enormous military expenditure of
¥ 2,540,000,000 is added with every prospect for additional
emergency expenditures. Whether Japan can bear such a heavy
financial burden at this time or not, is the question which is
uppermost in the mind of many a critic, both in Japan and
abroad. All the more, the Chinese propagandists have not
missed the opportunity of spreading pessimistic views on the
subject. The whole question is vital enough to demand serious
inquiry.
That modern warfare consumes enormous expenditure has
been conclusively shown by the late World War. Following are
the appalling figures for the six leading countries in that War:
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England .. ... ..... ... .... .. ... .... .... .......... . .
7,463,769,000 pounds
France .... :............ ..... .. .. .. .. .............. . 148,289,544,000 francs
Italy ....... ... ............. .. ...................... . 41,852,000,000 lires
Russia ........ ....... ....... .. .. ........ .......... . 54,098,500,000 roubles
Germany .... ........... ..... ... . : .. .............. . 139,342,342,000 marks
Austria ................ ....... .... ..... ..... .. .. . : .. 84,434,000,000 kronen

These gigantic military expenditures are met by the
general mobilization of the economic strength of respective
nations and depend upon people's savings, people's income,
and national wealth. Naturally there is a limit to the capacity to meet any large-scale military expenditures and,
when such a limit is passed, the living power of the people is
destroyed, social insecurity is precipitated by the shortage of
commodities, and the continuation of war is made impossible.
Thus, in order to conduct war effectively for a long period, it
becomes absolutely necessary that efforts to stabilize the living
conditions of the people should accompany the appropriation of
military expenditures. In other words, military expenditures
which will not destroy the living conditions of the people constitute the maximum capacity of the war-time national financial
strength which is at the same time the maximum economic
capacity to execute war. What then is the maximum capacity?
The late World War has shown us the following results:
(1)

Percentage of War Expenditures in Relation
to National Wealth

Countries
England .. ...... .
France .... .... .
Italy ........... .
Russia .... .... ... .
Germany .. ... .
Austria ..... ... .

National Wealth
16,000,000,000 pounds
256,500,000,000 francs
100,000,000,000 lires
120,000,000,000 roubles
310,000,000,000 marks
225,000,000,000 kronen
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PerWar Expenditures centage
· 7,463,769,000 pounds 46.6%
148,289,544,000 francs 57.7%
41,852,000,000 tires
41.8%
54,098,500,000 roubles 45.0%
139,342,342,000 marks 44.9,%
84,434,000,000 kronen 37.6%

(2)

Percentage of War Expenditures in Relation
to People's Income

Countries
England ..... ....
France ··· ······
Italy ..... .. .....
Russia ....... .....
Germany ......
Austria .. ...... .

(3)

Annual Income
2~00,000,000 pounds
37,000,000,000 francs
11,000,000,000 lires
15,000,000,000 roubles
40,000,000,000 marks
25,000,000,000 kronen

Average Annual War
Expenditures
1,756,176,000 pounds
32,548,760,000 francs
7,503,266,000 lires
13.527,150,000 roubles
34,144,787,000 marks
18,178,160,000 kronen

Percentage
76.0%
88.0%
68.2!'-'
92.0%
85.5%
72.7%

Percentage of War Expenditures in Relation
to People's Savings

Countries
England ... ......
France .........
Italy ...... ......
Russia .......... ..
Germany ......
Austria .........

Annual
People's Savings
370,000,000 pounds
6,000,000,000 francs
1,800,000,000 lires
2,500,000,000 roubles
6,500,000,000 marks
4,000,000,000 kronen

Average Annual War
Expenditures
1,756,176,000 pounds
32,548,760,000 francs
7,503,266,000 lires
13,527,150,000 roubles
34,144,787,000 marks
18,178,160,000 kronen

Percentage
468.3%
559.0%
416.6%
541.1%
525.2%
454.5%

In the World War, then, the Powers bore war expenditures amounting to 46% of their national wealth on the
average, 81% of the people's income and five times the people's
savings on the average as the average annual war expenditure.
The national capacity to bear war expenditures differ according to the economic structure and political situation of the
particular nation concerned, and the above figures cannot be
applied to all nations at all times. Granting this drawback,
the application of the above standard upon Japan gives the
following interesting results.
Japan's national wealth was estimated by the Government
Bureau of Statistics at ¥ 110,100,000,000 at the end of 1930,
and it may be safely estimated at ¥120,000,000,000 to-day.
Using the above standard, 46 % of this estimated national
wealth is ¥ 55,200,000,000, which means that Japan can bear
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at that rate an average annual war expenditure of ¥ 13,800,000,000 for four years.
In the next place, the Japanese people's income at the end
of 1930, according to the same source, was valued at ¥ 10,600,000,000 and one may safely place it at ¥ 14,000,000,000 to-day.
Therefore, Japan can stand 81% of this figure or Y 11,340,000,000 a year as war expenditures.
Lastly, the annual saving power of the Japanese people,
according to Dr. S. Hijikata, Professor of Economics at the
Tokyo Imperial University, is about 15% of their income which
would be roughly ¥2,100,000,000 on the basis of the above
figures for the people's income. If this amount is , multiplied
five times, we have ¥ 10,500,000,000.
The above figures are based upon Japan Proper alone. If
the figures for Chosen, Taiwan, and Manchuria are added,
Japan can easily bear an annual expenditure of 14 to 15 billion
yen. In the light of these figures, Japan, if forced to do so,
can issue government bonds amounting from 2 to 3 billion yen
several times a year and, even then, it still has enough reserve
power left. It is for this reason that Finance Minister Kaya
explained before the Special Session of the Diet that Japan's
economic power is not so small as to tax its whole capacity in
meeting the obligations of the North China Incident.
From the above considerations, the assertion that Japan's
economic strength cannot stand the burdens of the China
Incident appears to be merely a laughable sophistication. What,
then, would be the possible effect of the Incident upon Japan's
economic life ?
Under the present unfavouraple international balance of
trade, Japan's international balance sheet would lose its equilibrium and invite a disastrous inflation if she should do nothing
to meet the enormous amount of munitions and commodities
)

19

required by the Incident. For this reason, the Government is
proceeding cautiously in fashioning the national economic
organization on a war-time basis. Its chief purpose is to
maintain the equilibrium of the international balance sheet in
facing the consumption by the Incident of an enormous amount
of commodities and to help conserve the consumption of commodities which are not urgently needed so as to provide the
commodities which . are necessary for military consumption, and
for the expansion of the productive capacity of munitions industries. Thus the Special and Extra Sessions of the Imperial
Diet, besides approving the military appropriations totalling
¥2,500,000,000 took steps in legalizing various measures for
war-time economic control. Among them, the most important
are the Provisional Capital Regulation Law and the Provisional
Export and Import Control Law.
The Provisional Capital Regulation Law aims to expand
to the maximum limit, the productive capacity of munitions
and related industries by regulating the capacity of munitions
industries which is insufficient at present, thus enabling the
proper digestion of enormous war expenditures and the ample
production of munitions. It classifies the industrial activities of
the country into three major classes: (a) those which are
either directly or closely related to national defence ; (b) those
which are not vitally necessary at present, such as enterprises
with overproductive capacities or industries turning out luxuries; and (c) those which do not belong to either one of them.
It then recognizes in principle the new construction or the
expansion of existing equipment only in (a) and not in (b)
while it reserves the power to approve or disapprove the same
in (c) in accordance with their relations with national defence
or the international balance sheet at the time. It also extends
the limit for th~ issuance of industrial bonds to V 500,000,000
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or twice the current limit, and thereby aids the supply of
expansion funds by affording a favourable treatment to them.
In this manner, it proposes to expand to the maximum limit
the productive capacity of munitions and related industries.
The Provisional Export and Import Control Law invests
in the Government the dictatorial power of. supervising the
trade on the basis of the following outline :
1. The Government is authorized either to prohibit or
limit exports or imports by signifying the period and goods if
such is deemed necessary for national defence or people's
economy.
2. In the above cases, the Government, when it recognizes
a special necessity, is authorized to order necessary particulars
concerning the distribution or consumption of export or import
goods upon exporters and importers.
The greatest problem which concerns the people's economy
is, however, how much can the consumption of an enormous
amount of munitions materials-war-time consumption and
consumption for the purpose of expanding the productivity of
munitions-and the supply and demand of commodities for the
nation as _a whole be modified and readjusted as a result of
various policies adopted to assure them. The following points
will become important in this connection. (1) What portion
of the munitions consumption depends upon the imports and
payment abroad ? (2) How far can the internal supply of
commodities be increased as a result of strengthening and expanding productivity ? (3) How effectively can the control of
the consumption of commodities through various methods
adopted be realized ? Some lights upon these points may be
shed from the following considerations.
1. As a result of a sudden increase in the importation
of munitions materials this year, specie began to flow out of
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the country. This tendency must be eventually arighted. In
this case, increased importation of munition materials must be
met by prohibition or control of the importation of goods which
are not vitally needed at the present time, thus effecting a
proportional readjustment between the two.
2. With regard to the internally manufactured goods, the
goods which are not vitally needed now must be checked in
proportion to increased consumption of munition materials.
Actually, however, increased production caused by the expansion of productive capacity will naturally help lessen the
amount which necessitates control. In this manner, a radical
change is forced upon the substances for immediate consumption but, with the successful realization of increased productive
capacities of munitions industries and industries for manufactm::ing substitutes for imports, import control would be mitigated
and internal consumption revived.
3. The above observations are based upon the supposition
that the control of consumptions in the various fields can be
satisfactorily enforced. The problem remains whether or not
the enormously increased consumption of munitions can be met
by the control of consumptions in the other fields.
At present the Government has adopted or is planning to
adopt, roughly three methods for the control of consumptions :
(1) postponement or economization by the Government itself
of enterprises which are not immediately necessary ; (2) suppression among the general public of new expansion programmes
in enterprises which are not urgently necessary ; and (3) control of consumptions in general. These three methods must be
enforced as one to be effective, but (3) appears to be the most
important. (1) and (2) can be easily realized technically and
are already being realized through several legislations, but the
results so far are meager. This is naturally so, as the Govern22

ment consumptions outside of military expenditures constitute
a small portion in comparison with those of the general public.
Moreover, room for economization is quite limited while the
majority of general enterprises which are not urgently necessary already possesses an ample supplying power, and there
is only a small need for new expansion. Moreover, the control
of consumptions among the general public is at present largely
practiced through the people's voluntary control, but, with the
progress of the Incident, insufficient economization will appear
in the form of constant rise in prices. As the rise of commodity prices above a certain level cannot be permitted, both
from the point of view of the people's living standard and
the execution of war, the Government, once sensing the rising
trend in commodity prices, will try to control consumption by
mobilizing all available methods. The Government and the
people can cooperate closely in the future in meeting such a
situation.
After considering the immediate effects of the China Incident upon economic circles,· a question formulates itself as
to the possible contribution which an enormous military consumption may have upon Japan's future economic development.
Gt>nerally speaking, two situations can be visualized in
considering the effects of war upon the development of a
nation's economy. The one is that of European countries after
the World War, where, as a result of the War, each country
received a heavy blow, invited malignant inflation and decrease
of productive power, and experienced a penetrating impoverishment over a long period. On the other hand, the United
States of America, although a belligerent Power, not only received an extremely light economic blow from the Great War,
but, with the War acting as a turning point, rose trom an
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erstwhile debtor nation to a creditor nation and underwent a
.remarkable transformation from a nation of agriculture and
light industry to a nation whose national economy centered
upon a high degree of heavy industry.
Such a difference in the economic effects of the World
War may be said to be·due to a shorter period of the American participation in the War and a comparatively smaller
amount of military consumption. But the more fundamental
factor appears to be the difference in the stages of economic
development. The European countries arrived at the maximum
point of industrial development before the Great War, and
there was little room left for further development after the
War. And thus, enormous unproductive consumption resulting
from the War reacted as a destructive influence upon the
national ec~nomy of various nations. Against such a position,
the American industrial economy at the time of the World
War was undergoing a transformation from that of an agriculture and light industry to that of heavy and chemi~l industry. Naturally, the consumption of a large amount of wartime commodities accelerated the development of heavy industries, and the nation, at the same time bearing a heavy
war expenditure during the War, saw an amazing economic
development after the War.
The present stage of Japan's economic development. though
it differs decidedly in available resources, is in general similar
to that of the United States at the time of the Great War.
With the Manchurian Incident acting as a turning point,
Japan's national economy has been undergoing a transformation from the age of agriculture and light industry to that of
heavy and chemical industry. Without going into a detailed
discussion of the subject, the following statistics* may be used
as eloquent proof:
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1935

Industries

Amount of
production
(¥ 1,000)

Textile ..... .......... 3,352,560
Metallic ........ ... . 1,881,740
Machine and Tool 1,462,530
Chemical ... ......... 1,813,870
Total, ineluding
others ...... ... 10,836,890

*

1931

Percentage
30.9
17.4}
13.1 47.2
16.7
100.0

Amount of
production
(¥ 1,000)

Percentage.

1,9?6,800
431,430
498,010
816,650

37.2

6,178,130

100.0

8.3}
9.6 33.7
15.8

From the Industrial Statistics of the Department of Commerce and
Industry.

Such being the case, Japan's industrial economy which is
now gradually undergoing a transformation into heavy industry
has a bright future ahead. In the light of such a background,
the possible effects of the China Incident upon Japan's national
economy may take the following form.
1. A large portion of the military and war expenditures
will act as a fund for protecting and accelerating the development of Japan's heavy and chemical industries.
2. A large portion of the expanded munitions and fundamental industries, after replenishing the used munitions following the Incident, will be transformed to play a constructive
role in peace-time industry.
3. Japan's power of investing abroad will increase when
her ~ndustry is successfull~ transformed into the new basis of
heavy and chemical industries. For, under the present economic
structure, the power of investing abroad is determined largely
by the manufacturing power of capital materials (such as products of heavy and chemical industries) of a given nation.
4. The Far Eastern countries are on the whole agricultural as yet, and industrial development is awaiting future
attention. Naturally, the transformation of Japan's industry
into heavy and chemical industries will find markets by offering capital aid to the industrial development in those countries.
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Moreover, the industrial development of those agricultural
countries will increase their purchasing power and will in
turn contribute much toward the expansion of Japan's export
trade.

III. JAPAN'S INTERNAL REACTION
1. The Whole Nation Rallies to the Support
of the Government

When news of the Lukowkiao clash, resulting from the
unlawful firing on a unit of Japanese troops by soldiers of the
Chinese 29th Army, reached Japan, both the Government and
people, out of their sincere desire to avoid further bloodshed,
hoped for a peaceful, local settlement of the incident through
the prompt reconsideration of its attitude by the Chinese
Government. This feeling was clearly manifested in the following policy adopted by the Japanese Cabinet at its special
session on July 9:
1. Firm adherence to the policy of preventing aggravation of the incident.
2. Amicable settlement of the affair through reconsideration on the part of China.
In considering, however, the developments which took
place after the incident, one cannot help saying that such a
policy was taken by the Japanese Government due to its misconception of the actual conditions prevailing in China. Inasmuch as the Nanking Government adopted the policy of depriving Japan of all her vested rights and interests in China
by joining hands with the Red Popular Front and as thousands
of troops were poured into North China alone to show an extremely hostile attitude, what Japan should have done was to
immediately despatch large reenforcements to North China and
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deal a decisive blow upon the Chinese troops in order to force
the Nanking Government to reconsider its attitude.
Instead of taking such a step, the Japanese Government,
out of its sincere desire for a peaceful solution, firmly adhered
to its policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, and did
not decide upon the despatch of troops until July 11. As a
result, the Chinese forces, over-confident of their strength and
contemptuous of the numerically small Japanese troops, purposely aggravated the situation. The rapid worsening of the
situation causing imminent danger to Japanese lives in North
China became very apparent.
In view of these disquieting developments, members of the
Cabinet met in an urgent session on July 11 when they unanimously decided to send troops to North China in order to
forestall any untoward event that might lead to hostilities on
a major scale and also to protect the lives and property of
large numbers of Japanese ·nationals in the affected areas. The
prudent attitude with which the Japanese Government viewed
the alarming situation in North China may well be understood
from the following statement issued by the Government at
4:00 p.m. on that day:
The Japanese forces garrisoned in North China have always maintained a calm and patient attitude toward successive
anti-Japanese outbursts in North China. On the night of
July 7, an unfortunate clash occurred when the Japanese
troops were wantonly fired upon by soldiers of the 29th
Army, which had been cooperating with our forces in maintaining peace and order in that region. This led to such an
atmosphere of tension in the Peiping and Tientsin districts
as to cause deep anxiety for the safety of the lives and
property of Japanese nationals. However, the earnest endeavours of the Japanese authorities to localize the affair and
prevent further aggravation succeeded in bringing the 29th
Army· authorities to agree to a peaceful settlement.
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On the night of July 10, however, soldiers of the 29th
Army, in violation of the agreement, suddenly fired upon
Japanese troops, causing considerable casualties. The Chinese
have since pushed warlike preparations by increasing their
forces on the front lines, by advancing troops stationed at
Suiyuan to the South, and by sending forward troops of the
Central Government. The Chinese have thus not only failed
to evince any sincere desire for a peaceful solution, but have
gone the length of flatly rejecting all of Japan's proposals
for amicable settlement, leaving no room for doubt that the
present incident is the outcome of a well-organized agitation
for warlike action against Japan.
There is no need of stressing the vital importance to
Japan and Manchoukuo, of the maintenance of peace and
order in North China. What is most urgently needed for
the peace of East Asia is that the Chinese not only apologize
for their most recent lawless actions and manifestations of
antagonism ·to Japan, but give adequate guarantee against
the recurrence of such outrages in the future. An important
decision has been reached by the Japanese Government at
to-day's Cabinet meeting to take all necessary measures for
despatching military forces to North China.
But, desirous as ever of preserving the peace of East
Asia, the Japanese Government has not abandoned its hope
that negotiations may yet ~ure the non-aggravation of the ..
situation, and that prompt reconsideration on the part of
China may bring about an amicable solution. The Japanese
Government is, of course, prepared to give full consideration
to the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the Powers
in China.
The Attitude of the Political Parties. The tension over
the North China situation caused the political parties, even the
opposition Party, Shakai Taishuto (Social Mass Party), to pledge
full cooperation with the Government immediately after its
momentous decision to send military forces to North China was
announced, showing once more that always in Japan the threat
of hostilities from abroad has erased domestic political strife.
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The Minseito and. the Seiyukai, two major political parties,
held a special meeting of their executives on the same evening
the Government's decision was announced, and both adopted
resolutions unanimously expressing approval of the Government's policy. The text of the Minseito's resolution follows:
The maintenance of peace and stability in the Far East
as a whole and the establishment of the great principle of
cooperation and co-existence have always served as the underlying cause of the Empire's mission.
But, lacking the foresight necessary to share our view
concerning the whole of Asia, China has indulged in all sorts
of insulting acts of antagonism against us, finally precipitating
the present grave crisis.
Our party therefore will follow a policy of giving broad
and unqualified support to the Government in its efforts to
cope with the crisis, and sincerely expresses the hope that
the Government will achieve complete settlement of the Incident and that the Chinese will, as soon as possible, come
to reconsider their mistaken attitude.
The Seiyukai's statement was as follows :
The Government, at its meeting on Julv 11, reached
the momentous decision to prepare for the despatch of additional military units to China. Our party fully indorses the
timely step and will endeavour, in cooperation with the
Gover_,ment, to promote the sense of justice of the people
and to encourage the national spirit so that the entire nation
may be securely united behind the authorities.
The statement of policy issued by the Cabinet on July
11 is not merely an .expression of the Government's will, but
already that of the whole Japanese nation.
Our party is confident that China will eventually come
to realize the Asiatic problem in its true light and in its
entire as~ts.
Representatives of independent groups in the Lower House
met the following day (July 12), and after an exchange of
views, adopted the following resolution :
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We are firmly resolved to support the Government with
all our strength and will hope that the Government will
eventually obtain complete solution of the crisis.
Members of the Social Mass Party's central executive
committee also held a conference on July 12, and unanimously
decided that the party will fully buttress the Government in
tackling the North China crisis along the announced lines.
The different political groups in the House of Peers met
separately the day after the Government's announcement was
made, and also unanimously agreed to support the Government
in accordance with the spirit of national unity. Resolutions
fully approving the Government's decision were likewise adopted
by all the groups.
The Attitude of the Firw,ncial and Industrial Circles.
Similar expression of approval and support of the Government's
North Chma policy was manifested not only among the political parties, but also among the financial and industrial circles
throughout Japan. The day after the Government's decision
was announced, all principal and industrial bodies pledged to
extend their fullest aid to the Government.
In Tokyo, the Japan Economic Federation and the Japan
Industrial Club, sister institutions representing the Japanese
financial interests, held a joint meeting of their directorates
on July 12, and as a result of the discussions, unanimously
passed the following resolution which was immediate_ly conveyed
to the Government.
The Japan Economic Federation and the Japan Industrial Club recognize that the action taken by the Imperial
Japanese Government in conn,ection with the present North
China situation is really unavoidable for self-defence, and
hereby resolve to give full support to the Government.
The same day the Tokyo Clearing House held a meeting
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of its board of directors, and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce
and Industry a general meeting, and adopted similar resolutions. Representing the shipping interests, the Japan Shipowners' Association also decided to cooperate fully with the
Government. Many other leading financial bodies in Tokyo,
including the Japan Trust Society, the Japan Life Insurance
Association and the Savings Bank Association, likewise pledge
their support.
In the K wansai district too, all the leading bankers, industrialists, traders and businessmen of Osaka and Nagoya
promised to support the Government to the fullest extent.
Meanwhile, Vice-Governor Juichi Tsushima of the Bank of
Japan and Governor Toshikata Okubo of the Yokohama Specie
Bank conferred with Finance Minister Okinori Kaya and promised their full cooperation with the Government for the
maintenance of the yen's external value at 1s 2d and for the
stabilization of the bond market.
Japanese Popular Attitude. Upon the announcement of
the Government's decision to send troops to North China, the
Japanese people, fully cognizant of tne gravity of the situation,
were swept by the fire of patriotism. Patriotic sentiment was
strongly manifested both spiritually and materially.
From the very day the Government's decision was announced, thousands of people, forming long queues, thronged
the War and Navy Ministries in Tokyo daily, to offer monetary
contributions and comfort bags to bolster the spirit of those
called to arms. Donations received at the two Ministries since
the outbreak of the North China Incident up to August 31
(end of 50 days) had reached the huge sum of ¥ 16,215,979.
Of this amount the War Ministry received ¥10,062,977, comprised of ¥3,408,168 for the soldiers' relief fund, ¥5,904,710
for the national defence fund, and ¥750,099 for the military
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science and ·arts fund, and the Navy Ministry, V 6,153,002,
consisting of V 1,590,171 for the naval personnel relief fund
and V 4,562,831 for the national defence fund. The above
contributions were made by all classes of the people, rich and
poor, young and old. In the meantime, mountains of comf0rt
bags continued to pour into the two Ministries.
Centering at Tokyo, the popular drive for " war '' contributions spread like wildfire throughout the length and breadth
of the Island Empire. True to their functions as representative of the Japanese public in many lines, the newspapers
throughout the country, numbering some 1,300 in all, toQk the
leading part in the concerted drive for national defenoe funds
and comfort bags. The fervour with which the Japanese
public responded when the newspapers launched the drive for
• funds for the national cause, may clearly be seen from the
contributions -received by the following leading newspapers in
Tokyo and Osaka.
Contributions for air force expansion being collected by
the Tokyo and Osaka Asahi amounted to V 5,774,520.00 by
October 20. For the relief and comfort of the officers and
soldiers fighting in China, the Tokyo Asahi had raised ¥ 94,128.97, and the Osaka Asahi, ¥174,667.04 by October 15.
The Yomiuri's fund for the presentation of armoured
cars and tanks to the Army had reached ¥ 300,791.30 on
October 18.
Contributions being received by the Osaka Mainichi and
the Tokyo Nichinichi for the comfort and relief of the officers
and soldierF, the wounded, and their families totalled ¥831,089.20 and ¥ 680,473.60, respectively, up to October 20.
In addition to the monetary contributions, the newspapers
throughout the country are literally being swamped with comfort bags.
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The women of Japan were not to be left behind in the
popular patriotic movement. In fact the greater part of contributions were collected through the unselfish and self-sacrificing agency of women.
A nobler part played by the women in their patriotic
support of the nation was manifested in the form of gathering
on a piece of sash·a thousand stitches from a thousand women,
to be worn by the Japanese officers and soldiers at the front.
This is a unique Japanese practise called "senninbari." These
" senninbari " convey two divine prayers, namely preservation
of health and safety and national victory.
On street corners, at railway stations and other busy
spots, familiar scenes of women are noticed daily gathering in
intimate huddles-school girls, office girls, matrons and servant
girls-with heads bent together over little strips of cloth upon
which are traced a variety of patterns. Deft fingers can be
seen going to work with thread and needle, each feminine
passer-by invited to contribute one stitch or little knot. A
smile and a bow completes this little labour of love, and the
donor passes on to the next corner where the operation is
repeated. Thousands and thousands of these " senninbari "
have been sent to the Japanese soldiers fighting in China.
Among the numerous patriotic manifestations of the Japanese public, the following are picked at random from three
leading vernaculars.

Tokyo Nichinichi
Sept. 14.-The Kabuki Theatre in Tokyo held a matinee
performance on September 12, the proceeds of which, amounting to ¥501, were contributed to the Tokyo Nichinichi's fund
for the comfort and relief of the Japanese sOldiers in China.
Sept. 14.-Scores of members of the Volunteer Nurses'
33

Association of the Japan Red Cross Society are daily engaged
in making bandages and hospital gowns for the wounded
soldiers. On September 13, seven Princesses assisted them in
this thoughtful activity.

Tokyo Asahi
July 21.-Mr. Masaaki Iinuma and Mr. Kenji Tsukagoshi, who flew to London on· the Kamikaze in record time
last April, have turned over to the Asahi ¥ 30,286 which they
received from admirers following their successful flight. The
money will be given to the defence authorities for use in building military planes.
Sept. 14.-carrying a bag containing ¥25.37 in copper
coins, a 78-year old woman by the name of Sato Kitagawa
trudged in~ the Tokyo Asahi at 3 o'clock this afternoon and
requested that the money be spent for the comfort and relief
of the soldiers fighting in China. She said that her son took
part in the Russo-Japanese War but regretted that she had no
other to be of service to the . country in this current conflict.
The above sum represented her s~wings of one sen daily since
her 71st year.
Sept. 14.-Four representatives of the faculty and student
body of the Seitoku Girls' Commercial School called at the
Asahi to-day and contributed ¥ 459 to the Asahi's warplane
fund, which, they said. represented their savings during the
summer vacation.
Sept. 14.-Four girl pupils of the Akabane Primary School
presented ¥15.62 to the Asahi to-day, stating that they had
collected the money on Ginza Avenue.

Osaka Asahi
Sept. 15.-Patriotic sentiment is running high even among
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the 50,000 convicts in penitentiaries throughout the country.
Since the outbreak of the North China Incident, they have
been contributing to the war funds what little money they
had earned.
Sept. 15.-A certain youth living in Kanda, Tokyo, whose
elder brother is serving a sentence, has sent .a letter, written
in his own blood, to the Minister of Justice, pleading that he
be imprisoned in place of his brother so that he may serve the
nation by joining the Japanese forces fighting in China.
Sept. 15.-Defendants awaiting trial in detention cells in
Tokyo have requested the police authorities to give them any
kind of work which will be of service to the country. At present
approximately 200 defendants are engaged in knitting socks
(for soldiers) and other useful work.
Sept. 15.-0ne dark night a middle aged woman was seen
cycling on the Tsukudo Primary School grounds in Ushigome,
Tokyo. She mounted the bicycle, but was unable to hold her
balance and immediately fell. This act was repeated time and
time again until she finally fell down so badly with the bicycle
that she was unable to rise.
The school gateman who was nearby closely watching her,
r::tn up to her and was surprised to find her knees bleeding.
After stopping the bleeding, he asked her why she had been
practicing cycling at this time of the night. The woman
replied:
I am a greengrocer's wife and have four children; the
eldest one, who is a girl, is only 8 years old. I do not
know when my husband will be summoned to the colours,
but when he is ordered, I do want to show him that I can
well support the family and that he will have nothing to
worry and will be able to put body and soul into the fighting. It is my duty as a wife to relieve his anxiety while
he is in service. I am practicing cycling so that, besides
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looking after the store, I .will be able to go round to take
orders.
2. Resident Foreigners l\fanifest Support

It was seen in the foregoing section that the utmost
sincerity and unanimous support were given the Government
by the people of Japan. It was this burning patriotic spirit
behind the men under arms that sent them storming through
the enemy many times their own strength, under murdering
climatic conditions. On, on they charged, ever confident that
their people at home were back of them, calling for victory
that will restore peace and righteousness in the Far East.
Not to remain idle nor indifferent, resident foreigners and
travellers in Japan have also included themselves in the exalting procession of patriotism. Moved by the dauntless spirit
of the Japanese on the field, and the pure devotion at home,
these foreigners have sincerely manifested their support of the
stand of justice of the Empire of Japan. The following is ·an
extract of the countless number of instances that command
special attention.
On September 30, a certain Mrs. Grables.. wife of a
retired lieutenant-colonel of Scotland, visited the Miyakezaka
War Office through drizzling autumn rain, and presented the
sum of £ 60. Mrs. Grables was deeply impressed by the virtuous
conduct and discipline of the Japanese soldiers in Shanghai when
she visited there in the course of a round the world tour with
her husband and witnessed the raging hostilities at first hand.
On August 20, she contributed Y 200, made another donation
of ¥ 510 on September 23, and finally presented the afor&
mentioned £ 60 (£ 50 as her contribution and £ 10 as her
husband's gift) upon her departure from Japan. The Minister
of War, General Sugiyama, deeply regretted his absence, and
(i)
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that he was unable to be on hand to extend ~rsoJ;lally, the
gratitude and appreciation in behalf of his Ministry and the
whole nation. A letter of thanks was consequently addressed
to the kind donors from abroad. NeedJess to say, the Japanese
people's gratitude was beyond words.
(ii) On September 30, Mr. Paul Timme, director of the
German Steel Corporation of Marunouchi, Tokyo, called on the
War and Navy Ministries and ~resented ¥1,000 each for the
Japanese cause. Mr. Timme has been a resident in Japan for
the last twelve years, and is an ardent suppo~r of the
Japanese.
(iii) Mr. R. Jensen (Estonian), director of the Jensen
Factory in Omoll'i, Tokyo, is accredited with a touching episode.
A certain Okazaki Sannosuke, a temporary employee at
the firm, was ordered to active duty in China, and soon left
to report for duty. When his train left Omori Station, the
entire employees were on hand to bid their comrade farewell,
and at the head of this grand send-off was Mr. Jensen himself
who had called off a holiday in Okazaki's honor. Okazaki was
only a temporary employee, but regardless of this status, Mr.
Jensen generously arranged for the continuous payment of the
workman's wages during his service on the field. Leaving his
wife and five children at home, the deeply moved Japanese
answered the call to arms by his Government whole-heartedly
without any family attention dimming his glorious service at
the Chinese front. Following this memorable event, Mr. Jensen
organized a brass band from among his employees, allotting
hundreds of yen for the purpose. After vigorous rehearsal
sessions since the beginning of September, it was decided by
Mr. Jensen that his band be present at send-offs of all soldiers
from Omori Station.
(iv) On August 17, Mr. Paul Malesa of Azabu, Tokyo, a
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representative of the Roman Papal State, called on the Foreign
Office and made a statement to the following effect :
I cannot conceal my gratitude toward officers and men
of the Japanese forces. I would like to make this contribution to comfort the men of your country.
He kindly presented ¥ 300.
3. Protection of Resident Chinese Nationals
in Japan

Japanese subjects residing in China were subjected to deliberately cruel treatment that not only jeopardized peaceful
pursuit of occupation and commercial transactions, but also
endangered their very lives. So dangerous was the situation,
that practically all Japanese subjects were compelled to relinquish all property and holdings, for the possession of which
they toiled day and night in a foreign land under untold hardships, and evacuated their dwellings for safer localities. In
the face of the Tungchou massacre, a thing that no normal
human being could have done under any circumstance, resident
Chinese nationals in Japan are accorded the fullest and absolute
protection. These Chinese dread the day when Nanking should
call upon them to return home, since it is apparent that China
is no place to stay, homeland or no homeland.
Before the outbreak of hostilities, there were approximately 29,000 Chinese residing in Japan. Of this total, students
numbered 6,000, while merchants, cooks, tailors, barbers, etc.,
made up the remainder. Of those that returned home, students
naturally topped the figure since most of them went home
anyway for the summer vacation. About 20 or 30 members
of the Blue Shirt Society, and about the same number of the
C. C. Society, and a sprinkling of communistic elements were
included in the list that had "gone home." Kuo Mo-jo, a noted
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communist who had spent an exiled life in Japan, also saw to
it that he got back. Perhaps there are some anti-Japanese
elements still remaining, but in general those that decided to
stay are all mild in nature. They are all of the mind of staying here regardless of how serious the Incident might develop
into, a fact that gives sufficient proof that the Japanese people
are a kind and hospitable lot, that they are a people worthy
of a first class nation with a high standard of morality. There
are some episodes that are particularly worth mentioning.
Huang Ming-cheng, a student (from Kiangsi Province,
China), at the Tokyo Imperial University, comes from a
wealthy country family, but in 1929, all his family members
were killed by communist bandits. Leaving his inherited property of 2,450 acres in the custody of his uncle, he came to
Tokyo last March and took up the study of forestry in the
DeJ>artment of Agriculture and Forestry. Upon the outbreak
of the China Incident, the regular monetary allowance from
home ceased to come, leaving Huang at a loss. Apparently
he saw no way of going back upon the commencement of
summer vacation, and to stay in Tokyo without money seemed
equally miserable. He tried the Chinese Embassy for some
kind of relief, but met a flat refusal. Hearing of three Chinese
students returning home, he pleaded to them, but they showed
no sincerity to help their comrade in distress. When this
sad story reached the ears of Mr. Nagata (Japanese), a research fellow at the University, he felt deeply sympathetic toward the helpless student, and on August 17, gave the latter
¥100 for the sorely needed purpose. It is said that Huang
simply stood before his kind benefactor in mute emotional
gratitude.
(ii) Mr. Kumaji Tokui, principal of the Honda Primary
School, Osaka, has done much to develop friendly attitude and
(i)
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to insure proper treatment of Chinese children in his school.
He made the following statement :
In the special section of the Asahi, there were many
pictures portraying old Chinese women offering fresh water
to our soldiers, and sqme showing our men giving them delicious food, while still others depicted groups of Chinese
children highly overjoyed by candy gifts of our men. These
illustrations are invaluable as material for our daily instructions, and more than amount to a million schoolroom words.
As you already know, there are some 15 Chinese students
in our regular session, and about 30 in our evening session.
We are always working toward the development of a friendly
attitude between our people and the Chinese, and are doing
our best to find employment for the Chinese graduates in
cooperation with the police. Our Japanese children are taught
continually, "Do not mistreat your friendly neighbours
(Chinese), pay strict attention to your oral usages in speaking to them, befriend them and love them." We are very
glad that our Japanese students faithfully carry out our
daily teachings.
Interpolations regarding protection of resident Chinese
nationals took place in the Special Appropriations Session of
the 71st Diet.
Mr. Kawasaki (Minseito): '' Anti-Japanese insults and prejudices widely prevalent in China must be exterminated from
the very root. Although war has not been formally declared,
a state of war now exists in China, but those Chinese nationals
residing in our country are given full protection of life and
property while on the contrary, our subjects in China are subjected to insulting aspersions and extreme danger. Therefore,
is it not necessary that we issue a statement to make known
our fair and just attitude and activities to the nations abroad,
and to make clear our stand, that we protect all non-combatants not indulged in anti-Japanese propagation? "
(iii)
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Foreign Minister Hirota: " It is an international practise
to accord full protection to non-combatants as much as possible during warfare. In the present Sino-Japanese conflict,
Japan is working for the localization of hostilities and the
speedy settlement of the differences at issue. Our Government
does not entertain the slightest notion of conducting an extensive war against the entire people of China. We were compelled to make a strong determination by those radical Chinese
elements that propa.gate and incite erroneous anti-Japanese
thoughts ~mong the Chinese people, and in consequence obstruct
friendly Sino-Japanese cooperation in the Far East.
"Instructions concerning protection and treatment of
Chinese nationals were issued at the Gubernatorial Conference.
I instructed the Japanese people in this critical situation, to
remember that they are subjects of a great nation and that
they act accordingly, giving full protection to the Chinese
residents throughout our country at all times."

*

*

*

*

*

Blessed by the kind acts of their fellow countrymert and
more thankful, by the sympathetic manifestations of foreigners'
support, the courageous men marching under the flaunting
banner of the Rising Sun, add more audacity and morale to
their military a-ctivities, and build a strong belief that their
lives need not be sacrificed in vain, for is t}lere better proof
to show that they are fighting for justice ; for a virtuous
cause?
Such whole-hearted and unanimous support of the entire
nation, as shown by the examples cited, vividly portray the
tendency of the Japanese to place themselves en bloc behind
the policy of their Government. It must not be interpreted
that these manifestations simply represent the traditional
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Japanese spirit of nationalism nor as their lust of war
to carve pieces of territory with the knife of aggression.
Every man, every woman, and every child firmly believes that
the course of action, or the resort to arms by their country
for the salvation of the Far East, is the rightful step to take.
As noted above, Japan is not only concerned with her
vital economic interests in North China, but a concern of greater
importance lies deeply imbedded in the hearts of the Japanese.
Is there, after all, a graver problem before any state than
that of maintaining and safeguarding its very existence ? With
North China, nay, all of China stirred into feverish campaign
for Chiang's nationalism and communism sacrificing Japan's
friendship and good faith at the altar of red propaganda.
Can Japan rest assured that her insular empire will be left
unmolested by the far reaching, devastating fire of the disguised Chinese nationalism now raging on the continent, which,
should it take the feared effect would amount to nothing more
than gross Asiatic inter-racial suicide ? Will she permit
such a catastrophe to befall upon the millions of peace loving
peoples, without first putting up a brave fight, she is now
fighting?
With North China in safe and peaceful hands, and blessed
with warm Sino-Japanese parental. care, ready at all times to
slash the winding, entangling coils of the Comintern ~topus,
China and Japan has everything to gain and nothing to lose.
Do the people of China realize that? Unfortunately they do
not, and that is just what Nippon is trying to remedy. This,
and none other is Japan's fundamental policy. By crushing the
malevolent, treacherous Government of China, Japan hopes to
emancipate the Chinese people from the death bonds of communism, and to reawaken those from the slumbers of a mis-.
conceived utopia.
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Confident that their Government will accomplish this happy
but trying transformation, the Japanese nation responded in
full force to back the sacred crusade for great salvation with
blood and money.
It is true that personal confidence placed in Prime Minister,
Prince Konoye, has speeded unanimity. It is his first experience
as a minister of state, but his political abilities are immeasureable. His belief in international sincerity and amity, his liberal
political ideals, and his respect for parliamentary government
command no little praise and respect. Unfortunate as it is
that the China Incident broke out during his administration,
Japan is still fortunate with so capable a statesman at the
helm.
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